Slovakia has abolished its flat tax rate, but other Eastern and Central European countries are likely to continue with the policy by Peichi, Andreas
blo gs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/03/18/slovakia-abandon-flat-tax/
Slovakia has abolished its flat tax rate, but other Eastern and
Central European countries are likely to continue with the
policy.
by Blog Admin
Slovakia has maintained a flat tax rate for nearly nine years. Originally introduced with the aim
of stimulating investment and to show the world it had moved on from its former communist
economy, it has now been abolished by the country’s newly re-elected government. Andreas
Peichl analyses the effects of the flat tax since 2004, and what the results of the government’s
move to a more progressive tax system might be. He also concludes that, despite the lack of
data on its effectiveness, the remaining countries in Europe that still use a flat tax are unlikely
to abolish it.
In May 2004, Slovakia was the f irst Central European country to introduce a f lat tax and was considered as
one of  the role-models f or the movement towards lower, f latter tax structures. However, in January 2013,
Slovakia’s newly re-elected lef t-wing government (which had previously lef t the f lat tax regime unchanged)
re- introduced a directly progressive income tax (PIT) as part of  an austerity package.
In addition to the original f lat tax rate of  19 per cent, the PIT now has a second bracket of  25 per cent f or
incomes above a multiple of  176.8 of  an applicable subsistence minimum (currently amounting to
approximately €34,400). In addition, the corporate tax rate was increased to 23 per cent. This drew crit icism
f rom the opposition who f ear a reduction in investment. Slovakia introduced its f lat tax at the same time as
joining the EU in 2004, with the aim of  attracting f oreign direct investment in order to boost the f ormer
communist state’s economy. From its introduction, the policy seemed to work: the economy grew at rates
of  up to 10 per cent, unemployment decreased f rom 20 to 10 per cent, and government debt decreased
f rom 50 to 21 per cent of  GDP in 2008. So why has Slovakia abolished its f lat tax and what are the likely
consequences?
Let us start by looking at the history of  the f lat tax idea. By introducing the f lat tax in 2004, Slovakia
f ollowed the example of  the Baltic States and Russia. It was the f irst Central European country to do so
and many others f ollowed. This f lat tax movement, however, was not a new development in history. In f act,
until the f irst half  of  the 19th century, f lat taxes were common throughout the world. Progressive tax
schedules were f irst called f or by Marx and Engels in their “Communist Manif esto” (1848) and have since
been adopted by most countries. In the 20th century, f lat rate income taxes only existed in tax havens like
Hong Kong or the Channel Islands. However, since the collapse of  the Soviet Union, the f lat tax idea
(sparked by the academic contributions of  Hall and Rabushka) has been remarkably successf ul, especially
in f ormer Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Since its introduction in Estonia in 1994, several
countries f ollowed suit, including Russia (2001), Slovakia (2004), Georgia and Romania (2005), Macedonia
and Albania (2007), the Czech Republic and Bulgaria (2008), Bosnia (2009) and Hungary (2011).
Why did the f lat tax idea not spread to Western Europe and why is Slovakia the f irst country to abolish the
f lat tax by re- introducing a progressive system? One reason f or the success of  f lat taxes in transit ion
countries in Eastern Europe was the use of  the low marginal tax rate by new governments as a signal f or a
regime shif t towards more market-oriented policies. Furthermore, in most countries, the introduction of  the
f lat tax system was accompanied by additional ref orms of , f or example, the tax base, social insurance
contributions, benef its, indirect taxation and tax administration. In countries where such a signal or such
ref orms were not necessary (Western Europe), the f lat tax idea had less appeal.
The key arguments against a f lat tax are distributional ef f ects at the expense of  the middle class. These
might question the long-run sustainability of  f lat tax systems: “It is possible to have a f lat tax, or to have
democracy, but not both” (p. 92). In addition, the recent crisis has led to demands that the rich should pay
their ‘f air share’ of  the burden. This can also be seen f rom Figure 1, which shows the large increase f rom
2008 to 2009 in the share of  respondents who answered posit ively to the question of  whether the
government should reduce income dif f erences in Slovakia.
Figure 1: Redistributive preferences in Slovakia, 2004 – 2010
Source: ESS and ISSP
What can be expected f rom Slovakia’s move back to a progressive system? While the f lat tax ref orm was
expected to boost the economy, no causal empirical evidence apart f rom revenue-neutrality has been
reported. In general, clean empirical evidence of  the ef f ects of  introducing a f lat tax is scarce f or two
reasons. First, many things changed at the same time (entry into the EU, low labour costs, tax ref orm, etc.).
Second, usually no or lit t le high-quality (micro) data is available f or the pre-ref orm period. Yet, in the period
af ter 2004, Slovakia has seen strong growth and f alling unemployment, and it is still the f astest growing
country in the EU. Will this change?
The higher progressiveness of  the PIT should not have a large ef f ect as the top marginal rate of  25 per
cent is still rather low compared to other European countries, and estimates f or the elasticity of  taxable
income are usually small as well. The increase of  the corporate tax rate might be more problematic in the
short run as it might discourage f oreign direct investment. If  this occurs, then f irms leaving the country
might lead to increasing unemployment and lower tax revenues.
Will other countries f ollow Slovakia’s example? At least in Bulgaria, abolishing the f lat tax has been
extensively discussed. However, the f inance minister has recently abandoned such plans by arguing that
the country needs the f lat tax at least f or the next ten years to help the country catch up with other EU
member states. Thus, it seems that the f lat tax still has some lif e lef t in Europe, even if  one of  its key role
models has abandoned it.
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